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In a matching model of the academic labour market, with high-skilled
(brain) and low-skilled (local) workers, this paper shows that brain work-
ers are harmed by the local. This depends on two types of search frictions:
information and cooptation frictions. Search frictions reduce the proba-
bility to get an academic job for brain workers compared to the local.
A high level of cooptation discards the brain workers but, under certain
conditions, the absence of cooptation does not decreases the possibility
to get an academic job for the local workers. Whithin this framework,
some explanations about the low probability to catch the ￿brains￿ and
the obstacles for a e￿ective equal opportunity between local and outside
candidates are discussed.
JEL: I23; J45; J71.
Keywords: academic labour market, search frictions, cooptation, re-
cruitment system.
1 Introduction
In order to get a permanent academic job in Italy, it is necessary to take part
in national competitions. Calls for these competitions are rare and positions
are few. As a result, it is almost impossible for young researchers to experience
career advacements before 10 years after obtaining their Ph.D. Slow career pro-
gressions, low salaries, little competitiveness, few resources, bureaucracy, and
the lack of a meritocracy are all factors that discourage researchers from pursu-
ing careers in their home country.
European policies for years have been strongly oriented towards the promo-
tion of academic mobility and towards the creation of research networks and
projects within Europe. My main argument is that we are still far from this
and I shall show that some obstacles such as cooptation and information remain
and hinder such an evolution. In particular, I shall argue that the more informal
and implicit rules of recruitment that each scienti￿c area (S.S.D) uses to select
among numerous candidates reduce the meritocracy and the probability to get
a job for high-skilled candidates.
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1This paper analyzes an academic labour market with low-skilled (local), and
high-skilled (brain) workers that compete for open and cooptated academic va-
cancies. This paper presents a matching model with search frictions that reduce
the probability to get an academic job for the brain workers. In particular, the
information about the cooptated vacancies and high level of cooptation are the
two search frictions that have to be considered.
The model, a standard matching model, is kept as simple as possible and is
based on rather strong assumptions (to be discussed later) to let the possible
frictional e￿ects of cooptation emerge. The novelty of the paper, contrary to (or
at least not made explicit by) the existing literature, is the emphasis of coop-
tation on recruitment system of the academic labour market and the e￿ective
equal opportunity for all candidates to get an academic position.
The paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the literature and em-
pirical evidence about Italian and European academic labour market. Section
3 provides some characteristics about recruitment system. Section 4 builds the
model set-up. Section 5 shows the results of the model simulation. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the literature on the functioning of academic system and
its capability to attract ￿talents￿. In Gagliarducci et al. (2005), for example,
is explained the extreme localism that characterizes Italian academia and the
inability of academic system to attract foreign researchers. The authors conclude
that this happens not for a lack of ￿nancial resources but rather for a lack of
proper incentives re￿ected, for example, in academic careers based on seniority
rather than on research performance.
Becker et al. (2004), have exploited a dataset and the results obtained show
that during the 1990’s, Italy lost human capital through its emigration ￿ow. In
particular, a percentage varying between 3% and 5% of new college graduates
created in Italy has gone abroad, while only 0.3% of college graduates resident
in Italy were from a foreign EU country. The impression of an increased brain
drain is certainly con￿rmed by these data.
In Perotti (2002, 2008) there is a comprehensive description of the Ital-
ian academic system with a particular focus on recruitment procedures. He
shows, by means a detailed empirical evidence, the lack of meritocracy and the
widespread nepotism in Italian universities. This story is not so much distant
from the analysis of Durante et al. (2009) that explores the relevance of family
connections in the Italian academia as well as the relationship between nepotism
and scienti￿c production.
Finally, this paper is not so much distant from the analysis of Checchi (1999)
on the national academic competition for associate professorship which took
place in Italy during the academic year 1997-98. He provides an econometric
model and the empirical results reveal that the selecting committee has placed
great weight on local candidates and, at the same conditions, outsider appli-
2cants (located in foreign universities or holding non-academic positions) were
penalized.
Beyond the Italian context, Musselin (2004, 2005) provides an accurate pic-
ture of the French, Germany and UK academic systems. She ￿nds that there are
many formal and informal obstacles for an e￿ective academic mobility and the
foreign country careers still are an exception due to ￿accidental￿ opportunities.
This paper is directly related to this literature and some extensive anecdotal
evidence and proposes a matching model to explain how search frictions (coop-
tation and informational asymmetries) obstacle academic recruitment system
and the mobility of researchers.
3 Academic Labour Market
Focusing on Italy, Ichino et al. (2005) ￿nds that it is characterized by low rates
of retention and attraction of ￿talent￿ such as university graduates, researchers,
scientists and other high-skilled human capital. Italian university system rejects
the brains, only 2% of Ph.D students comes from a foreign country compared
to 26% of USA and 35% of UK. In the sector ￿Science and Technology￿(S&T),
only 1% of employed are foreigners. Italy has the negative supremacy for brain
gain from UE countries, and for brain drain to UE and USA.
For the ￿rst time, in 2001 Italy introduced a national research plan which
includes a series of strategic programs to better manage resources and increase
competitiveness in basic and applied research. The so-called operation ￿Brain
Buster￿, launched by the Italian Ministry of University and Research (MIUR) 1
aimed to attract back Italian scientists and/or foreign academics working in
the research sector abroad. Candidates willing to work in an Italian university
are selected through the ￿direct call￿ system and not through the usual proce-
dure contests, but this policy hadn’t the expected results and few researchers
accepted to come back in Italy. Many formal and more implicit obstacles can
thus identi￿ed to explain why academics do not apply more often for positions
in another country.
Following Perotti (2002), the rules for recruitment for all three researchers’
levels (ricercatore, professore associato, and professore ordinario) changed in the
last years. However, the result is that the recruitment process is no competitive
and, generally, the concorso comes with a label attached, that of the candidate
(usually the local candidate) who is intended to win.
In Europe, Kogan et al. (2001), Musselin (2004) have shown that salaries,
recruitment procedures, career patterns, promotion rules are very di￿erent from
one country to another, nevertheless the European countries are experiencing a
common convergence towards a more homogenious system. Among the many
objectives that can be attached to the European policies one can outline the
creation of an European academic labour market and the development of career
patterns which are less oriented to the home market. But for this to be the ￿rule￿
rather than the exception the academic labour market has to simultaneously
1with the Law DM (2001).
3present speci￿c properties. First, it has be transparent, so that recruitment has
to rely only (or primarly) on impersonal criteria. Second, the information about
the distribution of the jobs and theirs characteristics required is explicitly known
and di￿used. But none of these conditions are satis￿ed by national academic
labour market and these are the main obstacles for an equal opportunity between
all researchers.
The aim of this paper is to show how these obstacles represent search frictions
that reduce the mobility and hinder the internationalization of academic labour
market.
4 The model Set-up
Matching models (Pissarides, 2000, Rogerson et al., 2005), which have become
the standard reference for the analysis of equilibrium unemployment, focus on
the coordination failures stemming from a decentralized search mechanisms.
They generally consider both the decisions of workers and the decisions of ￿rms.
Here, I also focus on the coordination failure arising from decentralized
search in an economy with a number Va of academic vacancies. Only a fraction
of academic vacancies will be based on meritocratic criteria and will consider
the brain workers, while the cooptated academic vacancies can be ￿lled only
by local workers. I assume that brain workers, Nb, are not able to distinguish
between cooptated and no-cooptated vacancies, since applications that are di-
rected toward cooptated jobs are wasted. This seems to be consistent with what
we observe in the real world: the brain workers that live in other countries and
want to come back in Italy, have an incomplete information about the academic
vacancies and which of these are cooptated.
In Italy the recruitment periods are thus disconnected and there is no vis-
ibility of all vacant positions for a candidate: if we imagine that s/he applies
for di￿erent positions, s/he will receive answers at very di￿erent moments, thus
enable to be in a situation of comparing di￿erent alternatives. This is the main
reason to assume a one-period matching model in which each candidates posts
randomly one application.
Cooptated vacancies are jobs that require an ex-ante knowledge of the can-
didates and their personal characteristics (i.e., a local candidate). I assume that
a fraction  of academic vacancies are open and consider brain workers appli-
cations too. I assume a distribution function G() of vacancy (Va) with [0;1],
where 0 is the absence of meritocracy (all vacancies are cooptated), while 1 is a
meritocratic recruitment with all academic vacancies open. I assume that G()
is the fraction of academic vacancies that consider brain workers applications,
and select on meritocratic criteria.
The information structure and application strategies can be summarized in
the Table 2.
worker type applies to considered by
Nb Va [G()]Va
Nl [1   G()]Va [1   G()]Va
4Table 2: Information structure and application strategies.
For the sake of simplicity, I keep the total number of available jobs and
workers constant and exogenous. I assume the same number of vacancies and
workers, with Va = Nl + Nb, and Nl = Nb. This modelling strategy also allows
simple comparative statics exercises on what happens into the academic labour
market, and the di￿erent unemployment rates (probability of not ￿nding an
academic job) between local and brain workers.
4.1 The basic matching model with identical workers
In a simple one-period matching model I assume there are N workers with
no distinction between brain and local workers, and Va academic vacancies.
Suppose each worker posts randomly one application, and each vacancy chooses
randomly among its list of applicants. A vacancy remains un￿lled only if it
receives no applications, since a worker remains unemployed only if the vacancy
s/he has applied to receives multiple applications and that worker is not selected.
The ￿one application￿ assumption is generally used because it provides a
minimal model to catch the core coordination problem. Even when workers
send multiple applications happen that some vacancies receive no applications
at all, and some vacancies are not able to hire any of their applicants because
all of them have already been hired by other vacancies 2.
The number of contacts between vacancies and workers is given by
m = m(Va;N): (1)
The probability that a vacancy remains un￿lled, hence the share of open
un￿lled vacancy, is:




since each worker has a probability 1   1
Va not to apply to that vacancy.3
Let a = Va
N be the measure of market tightness: the higher a, the tighter
the market. The share of workers that remain unemployed on the labour market
is given by
u =
N   Va(1   va)
N




Note that the coordination problem is entirely caught by va: the number
of unemployed workers is just N   Va(1   va), i.e. N minus the number of
￿lled academic vacancies. Note that the unemployment rate is decreasing in
the market tighteness and, holding market tightness constant, in the size of the
market4.
2The multiple application case has been analyzed in Albrecht (2003).
3For large N and Va, a good approximation to (1   1
Va )N is the exponential e N=Va that
gives the matching function m = Va(1   e N=Va).
4See the Appendix.
54.2 The role of frictions with cooptated vacancies
We can characterize the model according to its informational structure. I as-
sume that local workers are able to recognize cooptated academic vacancies in
the sense that they have an informational advantage based on their localiza-
tion. Moreover, I assume that local workers do not post their application to
open vacancies (this assumption will be relaxed in the subsection 5.1). As for
what concerns brain workers, they have limited information about cooptated va-
cancies and they send their application randomly to all Va. Moreover the brain
workers applications will be considered only by a G() fraction of open academic
vacancies, with the consequence that many brain applications are wasted.
The total number of contacts between academic vacancies and workers is
expressed in (1), and (2) equations. Now, it will be shown a di￿erent situation
for local and brain workers.
It is possible to consider the unemployment rate for each side of the market.
The probability that a cooptated vacancy does not receive any application
from a local worker equals




That is, the probability that a cooptated vacancy is ￿lled with a local worker
equals (1   vc).
The share of local workers that do not get an academic job is given by
ul =




The number of unemployed local workers is just Nl   [1   G()]Va[1   (1  
1
[1 G()]Va)Nl] , i.e. Nl- the number of ￿lled cooptated academic vacancies by
local workers.
While, the share of brain workers that do not get an academic job is given
by
ub =




The unemployment rate (ub) for brain workers is increasing in the market
dimension Va, and decreasing in G().
It is possible to compare the probability for brain and local workers of ￿nding
a job and note that when G() = 0, that is when there is no meritocracy in the
academic system and all vacancies are cooptated; ub > ul. When G() > 0, the
brain workers probability of ￿nding an academic job increases, while the local
workers are progressively discarded.
Brain workers support a double search friction: the level of cooptation [1  
G()], and the informational asymmetry about the distribution of the cooptated
vacancies.
6The question is: what is the level of cooptation [1   G()] that reduces to
nil the search frictions and attributes the equal probability to get an academic
job for local and brain workers?
5 Simulation and results
The simulation5 is set as follows. At t = 0, Nb brain and Nl local workers
are create. There are Va academic vacancies that are distributed between open
G()Va, and cooptated [1 G()]Va. At the beginning of every period, all indi-
viduals become unemployed (the separetion rate is 100%), and all jobs become
vacant. Hence, every period is equivalent to a new run. Each run involves 100
brain workers, 100 local workers, 200 academic vacancies lasts for 1000 inter-
actions. In each run, the G() value is increased of 0:05. The values of the
probabilities ub for brain and ul for local of not ￿nding a job, are the average
of the last 500 iterations of each run. The parameters are described in Table 3.
Parameter Range Default value Meaning
Nb [1;1] 100 Brain workers
Nl [1;1] 100 Local workers
Va [1;1] 200 Academic vacancies
[1   G()] [0;1] :05 Share of cooptated vacancies
Table 3: Parameters.
The model simulation shows that the probability of not ￿nding an academic
job for brain workers (ub) decreases with a decreasing number of cooptated va-
cancies. There is a level of cooptation (w 0:3), that ensures an equal probability
to ￿nd an academic job for local and brain workers. The resulting probabilities
of not ￿nding a job, for di￿erent share [1   G()] of cooptated vacancies, is
reported in Figure 1. However, the net reduction of search frictions is obtained
when G() = 0:7, and ub = ul. This is the level of sustainable cooptation that
reduces to nil the search frictions and guarantees the equal probability to get
an academic job for all workers (local and brain). From another point of view,
it represents the minimum level of meritocracy that should be attained by a
recruitment academic system to give the same opportunity to brain workers.
5The simulation is written on NetLogo open source agent-based platform. The code is
available from the author upon request.
7Figure 1: Probability of not ￿nding a job. Local vs. Brain workers with a
decreasing level of cooptation.
It can be noticed that for G() = 1 (i.e. all vacancies are open), local
workers are totally discarded and their probability of not ￿nding a job is equal
to 1. This is a consequence of the model assumptions, the local workers do not
post their applications to open vacancies but only to the cooptated ones. In the
subsection 5.1, I assume that the local workers can apply their applications to
the open vacancies too.
5.1 Local workers apply to all vacancies
Often, the assumption that local workers are able to send out their applications
only to cooptated vacancies is quite unrealistic. They are perfectly able to
recognize the cooptated vacancies but, at the same time, are able to send their
applications to the open vacancies too. In real situations, the recruiting process
make a ranking of suitable candidates and then try to hire starting from the top.
It is possible that the best candidate (brain) refuses the job or withdraws his/er
application during the recruiting process and, in this case, a local worker can be
hire. For this reason, I assume that local workers send their applications to all
open and cooptated vacancies (Va). The informational structure and application
strategies can be summarized in Table 4.
worker type applies to considered by
Nb Va G()Va
Nl Va Va
Table 4: Informational structure and application strategies.
The simulation is built as in the previuos section with the same parameters
values, for an increasing fraction of open vacancies, G(). The results show a
8symmetric condition between local and brain workers as regard the informational
structure. It can be observed in Figure 2 that when all vacancies are opened,
G() = 1, so that there is no cooptation in the academic labour market, the local
workers have a positive probability of about w 4% to get a job. This interesting
result shows that in a perfectly meritocratic system there is a positive probability
to select a local low-skilled worker too.
Figure 2: Brain vs. Local without asymmetric information.
This theoretical result is coherent with the empirical analysis of De Paola
and Scoppa (2011). They show how the last Italian university reform of the re-
cruitment system6, does not change the higher probability for a local candidate,
that comes from a university opening a position within the present competition,
to get a vacancy. In average, a local candidate has about more than 29% of
probability compared to the outsiders candidates and this percentage increases
when a member of the committee (except the internal one) comes from the same
university of the local candidate.
6 Concluding remarks
Is this an adequate explanation of frictions and obstacles that reduce the prob-
ability to get an academic position for many brain high-skilled candidates? As
shown in this paper, the academic labour market su￿ers two di￿erent search
frictions obstacles: cooptation and incomplete information. A high level of
cooptation has been indicated as the principal cause to explain the low proba-
bility for outsiders brain workers to get an academic position and the results of
model simulation con￿rm this. The second obstacle is represented by the lack of
transparency and the incomplete information between local and brain workers.
6Now, in D.L. 180/2008 the committee is selected randomly.
9There are two main reasons to explain the usefulness of conducting this type
of analysis. The ￿rst one is to provide a generalization and theoretical counter-
part to several empirical studies. The ￿rst conclusion presented in this paper is
that there is a level of suitable cooptation that reduces the search frictions and
posits brain and local candidates with the same probability to ￿nd an academic
job. This is a discrimination problem. Checchi (1999) argues that sometimes the
selecting committee takes into account some disadvantage of a restrict number
of candidates (women having children, candidates from southern universities,
ecc..), and applies a positive discrimination to favor these candidates. In this
paper, instead, I focus just on search frictions like as objective causes of dis-
crimination between candidates and provide a framework to their emerging.
The second result of this exercise is that with a totally meritocratic re-
cruitment system (i.e. no cooptation), the low-skilled local workers have also a
positive probability to ￿nd a job too. This is a good argument for a meritocratic
policy into the academic labour market. It shows that in a completely merito-
cratic recruitment university system, the local low-skilled candidates can play
an important role too. It can be expected that the brain high-skilled candidates
will compete for the most prestigious academic vacancies avoiding the less ones
that will be ￿lled by the local candidates.
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Appendix A1
Here I prove that the probability of not getting a job (u) is decreasing in market
tightness and increasing in the size of the market.





Va)N(N + Va   1)
Va   1
  1
Taking logs, this derivative is negative whenever N(ln(Va   1)   ln(Va) <
ln(Va   1)   ln(N + Va   1), which is always satis￿ed.






N [1 + (Va   1)ln(1   1
Va)]
Va   1
and is positive whenever the term in the square brackets is greater than 0,
that is whenever ln(Va 1) ln(Va) >   1
Va 1, which is always satis￿ed because
of the curvature of the logarithmic function.
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